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 1 
Authority after Emergency Rule 
 
Jonathan White  
Associate Professor (Reader) in European Politics 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
(forthcoming, Modern Law Review) 
 
In the context of economic crisis, Europe has witnessed a spate of extraordinary political measures 
pressed by executive discretion.  This paper examines what emergency rule of this kind implies for the 
possibility of normal rule thereafter.  Political decision-makers face the challenge of drawing a line 
under the crisis so that the unconventional measures used to handle it do not compromise the polity’s 
norms in lasting fashion.  Based on an analysis of the preconditions for plausibly making such an act of 
separation, I suggest the principal resources for doing so in the EU case are missing.  Emergency rule 
will tend to blend in with normal rule, to the detriment of the political order’s legitimate authority.  A 
more dubiously-grounded ‘descriptive’ authority may conversely be enhanced by emergency rule, as may 
compliance for instrumental motivations, producing a polity that is stable even if weakly legitimate.* 
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Faced with what they designate an emergency, political executives are apt to take 
extraordinary measures.  These include the suspension or overriding of selected norms, and 
the exploitation of the freedom this affords to set up new kinds of governing arrangement.  An 
interesting and politically significant problem concerns what the legacy of such manoeuvres is 
likely to be.  What is the effect of executive discretion under the heading of emergency for the 
later authority of the political community’s norms?1 
The question is valid for any polity’s experience with emergency rule.  The case that 
inspires the present paper concerns the EU’s response to the Euro crisis beginning in 2010.2  
Emergency politics has here been a central component here in the political handling of socio-
                                                          
* For comments on a draft, I am very grateful to Chris Bickerton, Achim Hurrelmann, Jan Komárek, Christian 
Kreuder-Sonnen, Liz Monaghan, Bill Scheuerman, Frank Wendler, Mike Wilkinson and Lea Ypi; audiences in 
Washington D.C., Prague, Cambridge and Hull gave valuable additional input.  The article was completed 
during a fellowship at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, supported by the EURIAS programme. 
1
 A classical understanding of discretion is offered by Locke when outlining executive prerogative, i.e. as action 
‘without the prescription of law, and sometimes even against it’ (J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. 
Laslett (Cambridge: CUP, 1988), II 160).  In this paper I understand discretion analogously but in relation to the 
wider concept of norms (see below), allowing the impact of emergency politics to be observed on widely-
accepted standards of appropriate conduct which may or may not be codified in positive law, yet which are 
crucial for the legitimacy of political rule nonetheless. 
2
 For an analysis of the succession of events commonly called the ‘Euro crisis’, and of the political stakes in 
these definitional questions, see: A. J. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’ (2013) 14(5) 
German Law Journal, 453-526. 
 2 
economic disturbance.  Decision-makers have recurrently invoked conditions of crisis to 
justify significant displays of executive discretion.
3
  One has seen interstate conditional loans 
apparently ruled out by treaty commitments employed to satisfy investors and reshape 
national economies, supported by derogations from such norms of representative democracy 
as the unhurried parliamentary scrutiny of legislative proposals and the legitimate 
mobilisation of dissenting opinion.  Unconventional procedures have been used to set up 
policy regimes that are substantially new: steps, initially outside the EU framework, towards 
the ever-closer monitoring of national budgets, along with major innovations in the policy-
making of the European Central Bank (ECB), are just some of the salient examples.  
Exceptionalism and improvisation have been widespread – and not always easy to distinguish, 
as purportedly temporary measures acquire a lingering quality.  All such measures have been 
rationalised as necessary responses to exceptional and urgent threats.
4
  Despite some 
peculiarities we shall examine, the EU experience displays many of the features typical of 
contemporary emergency politics, being extended in time, transnational in reach, and 
addressed to socio-economic affairs rather than matters of security traditionally understood. 
In the paper’s first section I specify the problem.  I look at some of the fundamental 
norms challenged in the course of the Euro crisis, and set this in the context of the general 
contribution of norms to legitimate political authority.  To fulfil this contribution, I suggest, 
they must be generally regarded as binding.  The practices of emergency rule challenge their 
                                                          
3
 See C. Joerges, ‘Law and politics in Europe’s crisis: On the history of the impact of an unfortunate 
configuration’ (2014) 21 Constellations, 249-261; C. Joerges, ‘Europe’s economic constitution in crisis and the 
emergence of a new constitutional constellation’, in J. E. Fossum and A. J. Menéndez, The European Union in 
Crises or the European Union as Crises? ARENA Report No 2/14 (Oslo: ARENA, 2014), esp. 12ff; C. Kreuder-
Sonnen and B Zangl, ‘Which post-Westphalia? International organizations between constitutionalism and 
authoritarianism’ (forthcoming) European Journal of International Relations; D. Curtin, ‘Challenging Executive 
Dominance in European Democracy’ (2014) 77(1) Modern Law Review, 1-32; K. Dyson, ‘Sworn to Grim 
Necessity? Imperfections of European Economic Governance, Normative Political Theory, and Supreme 
Emergency’ (2013) 35(3) Journal of European Integration, 207-222; H. Brunkhorst, Das doppelte Gesicht 
Europas. Zwischen Kapitalismus und Demokratie (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2014); J. White, ‘Emergency 
Europe’ (2015) 62(2) Political Studies. 
4
 Note that ‘emergency’ as used here describes a mode of rule, not the circumstances in which it is exercised.  
There is a risk one takes at face value the objective existence of an emergency whenever one speaks of 
emergency rule: to avoid this, I refrain from using ‘emergency’ when referring to objective conditions (using 
alternatives such as ‘crisis’ where appropriate).  
 3 
binding character.  Significant in this regard is not just the level of exceptionalism that has 
been displayed in the Euro crisis but also its visibility.  Executives and commentators alike 
have acknowledged it – a function one must assume of its distinctly economic basis – with the 
result that retrospective denial is difficult.  This poses with full force the question of 
exceptionalism’s political legacy.  
The second section examines the possibility that the problem is contained: that what 
emerges from a period of emergency politics is a set of norms of enduring credibility. Such an 
outcome would hang on a successful act of closure: a line is drawn under the crisis period, 
such that the extraordinary measures taken do not contaminate the institutional regime that 
ensues.  By a successful act of partitioning, emergency rule is prevented from casting 
lingering doubt on the regularity of what follows.  While this may be a widely-held goal, the 
analysis suggests it is elusive.  To achieve it, decision-makers would need to make a 
convincing case for why they will not resort to extraordinary measures again.  Specifically, 
they would need to make one of three claims: a) that the conditions of crisis will not recur 
(e.g. because better policy-making will ward them off), or b) that, should crisis recur, new 
procedures are in place that will minimise executive discretion, or c) that the identity of the 
decision-makers has changed, such that those with a proclivity for extraordinary measures 
have left the political stage.  I suggest the preconditions for credibly making claims to this 
effect are absent in the EU context.   
As the section thereafter argues, persistent weakness in the polity’s norms must 
therefore be reckoned with.  Those suspended, violated or evaded, as well as others not 
directly challenged, are put in question by emergency rule and deserve to be met with 
scepticism concerning their capacity to bind.  The effect is a polity whose legitimate authority 
is compromised.  While the current period of emergency rule reveals this truth with some 
clarity, the problem is not unique to the present.  In different guises, the challenge of 
 4 
exceptionalism has recurred in EU history.  Though it differs in scale and details in each 
instance, as a form it is prone to repeat. 
Emergency rule compromises the rightful authority of the polity, yet whether it then 
receives the critical attention it deserves is a different matter, as the final section underscores.  
While public perception of the binding character of norms may be dented, there are also ways 
in which emergency rule strengthens the confidence directed their way.  Descriptive authority 
may consolidate, just as legitimate authority falters.  Furthermore, even where perceptions of 
authority are not strong, levels of compliance may nonetheless rise due to considerations of 
power and political uncertainty.  What emerges from emergency rule may therefore be a 
polity which, though weakly legitimate, is all the more functional in outward appearance.  
How political exceptionalism might be constrained in future is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but the analysis carries some implications.  These are flagged up in the conclusion.  
 
 
Emergency rule in the Euro crisis 
 
Much has been written on how the political response to the Euro crisis challenges specific 
legal provisions.  Whether key manoeuvres of crisis management were compatible with 
specific articles in the EU’s treaties has been central to the critical appraisal of executive 
power.  The consistency of the emergency credit facilities with the ‘no bail-out clause’ of 
Article 125 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and the 
legality of the ECB’s ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ (OMT) policy in light of Article 123, 
have been the main axes of this debate.
5
  This emphasis on the standing of legal provisions 
                                                          
5
 See e.g. Ka. Tuori and Kl. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 
esp. chap. 5; M. Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law 
Review 1777–1806; S. Douglas-Scott, ‘The Problem of Justice in the European Union: Values, Pluralism, and 
Critical Legal Justice’, in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012); see also the CJEU’s Pringle judgement.  
 5 
mirrors the concerns of much of the wider theory of emergency rule, where the first casualties 
of exceptionalism are often considered to be norms that are legally enshrined (individual 
rights of movement and assembly for instance).
6
   
Crucial as specific infringements may be, it deserves emphasis that the casualties of 
emergency politics are not reducible to commitments formally codified.  At least as important 
for the problem of authority that concerns us is the transgression of norms which, though 
widely acknowledged and with some backing in the textual sources of positive law, are not 
easily traced to a unique source.  The violation of such norms is arguably the crux of 
emergency rule: while in any imperfect political order there may be codified rules that cannot 
reasonably be upheld at all times, it is the infringement of fundamental principles, and of the 
institutional procedures that plausibly serve them, that warrants particular attention.  
Especially in a polity that lacks a comprehensive written constitution, the violation of such 
norms is the defining feature of emergency rule.
7
  We may highlight just a few as they are 
found in the EU context, as a basis on which to proceed with an analysis of the longer-term 
implications of their transgression.
8
 
One of the major sources of unease with the political response to the Euro crisis has 
been that it challenges a norm of state sovereignty on matters not transferred by national 
parliaments to the decision-making of EU institutions.  The norm finds backing in treaty 
sources,
9
 and has been conventionally expressed in the nationalised procedures of decision-
                                                          
6
 The literature is large: for good overviews, see O. Gross and F. Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency 
Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2006); V. Ramraj (ed.), Emergencies and the Limits of 
Legality (Cambridge: CUP, 2008); A. Klieman, ‘Emergency Politics: the Growth of Crisis Government’ (1976) 
70 Conflict Studies, 16ff.   
7
 As Hjorth notes, the idea of exception presupposes a ‘dense normative structure’: while in some contexts a 
written constitution may be the clearest expression of such, in others this condition may be fulfilled without such 
a text – as for instance a close-knit international society such as the EU; cf. R. Hjorth, ‘The poverty of 
exceptionalism in international theory’ (2014) 10(2) Journal of International Political Theory, esp. 181ff.  
8
 See also C. Joerges, ‘Law and Politics …’, n 3 above, 251; C. Joerges, ‘Brother, can you paradigm?’ (2014) 
12(3) I•CON, 778; C. Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘Global Exceptionalism and the Euro Crisis: Schmittian Challenges to 
Conflicts-Law Constitutionalism’, in C. Joerges and C. Glinski (eds), The European Crisis and the 
Transformation of Transnational Governance (Oxford: Hart, 2014); C. Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2014). 
9
 Something like a norm of enumerated powers can be found in Article 5(2) TEU: ‘Under the principle of 
conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States 
 6 
making for taxation policy and welfare spending.  A number of the key measures of crisis 
response have put this norm under pressure.  The use of conditional loans as a way to enforce 
reductions in public expenditure in member-states dependent on financial support is a notable 
instance.  Not only do these loan agreements specify the level of cuts to be made, but also in 
what areas they are to be made, with public-service provision to the fore.
10
  Another 
encroachment is the requirement that Eurozone member-states make their national budgets 
available for supranational inspection so that the Commission may instruct their revision.
11
  
The imposition of these measures amounts to a sharp exercise of discretion by the European 
Council and its leading powers in departure from an established understanding of the division 
of powers in the Union.   
Equally challenged by the handling of the Euro crisis has been a norm of democratic 
control.  Before the crisis, a familiar rationalisation for the EU’s distribution of powers was 
that policy-making with redistributive consequences was exclusively to be made by elected 
institutions.
12
  The norm reflects basic intuitions about conflicts of interest and principle in the 
allocation of societies’ resources.  In the crisis period, it has been infringed not just by the use 
of the Commission to discipline national budgeting, but by the role of the ECB in establishing 
new policy regimes (Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), quantitative easing) that have 
distributional consequences, as well as in resisting other outcomes (e.g. a member-state 
default) that would have distributional consequences too.  The IMF has also played a central 
yet democratically questionable role, helping to set the conditions of loans and to monitor 
                                                                                                                                                                      
in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.’ 
10
 On the major policy shifts imposed on debtor states in areas beyond EU competence (e.g. public-service 
provision) by the application of ‘Memoranda of Understanding’, see A. Fischer-Lescano, Human Rights in Times 
of Austerity Policy: The EU Institutions and the Conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2014), 93ff.; also Tuori and Tuori, n 5 above, 99, 188. 
11
 See esp. EU Reg. 1174/2011, where penalties for ignoring Commission ‘recommendations’ are outlined.   
12
 See e.g. G. Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration (Oxford: OUP, 2005).  Critics tended to dispute not 
the norm itself, but the suggestion that large areas of policy-making did not have redistributive implications and 
could therefore be decided by non-majoritarian institutions: see S. Hix and A. Follesdal, ‘Why there is a 
Democratic Deficit in the EU: a Response to Majone and Moravcsik’ (2006) 44(3) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 533-562.  The references to democracy in the EU treaties have tended to be quite general (cf. TEU, 
Preamble), but the norm finds clearer expression in some national constitutions (e.g. Germany's). 
 7 
their compliance.
13
  Even if one judges such manoeuvres to stop short of outright illegality, 
they challenge a basic political norm and the institutional arrangements that serve it.
14
   
At stake has also been a widely-shared norm of political contestation.  Introduced under 
the sign of emergency, the principal measures of this period have generally been implemented 
at speed, with opportunities for meaningful argument in parliaments and publics significantly 
reduced.  The institutional routines designed to enable contestation, including parliamentary 
timetables and debates, have repeatedly been sidestepped or compressed, and the legitimacy 
of dissenting opinion questioned, in the Mediterranean countries especially but not only.
15
  
The attenuation of debate derives added significance from how certain measures – e.g. the 
budgetary rules associated with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG / Fiscal Compact) – aim to effect constitutional 
change or its equivalent in the member-states.  By calling for debt limits in domestic law, they 
significantly restrict the macro-economic policies that can be pursued.
16
  By these 
extraordinary means, far-reaching political change has been enacted without the public 
scrutiny appropriate to it. 
Finally, a further norm challenged in the present period is that of the equality of states.  
The norm has conventionally been honoured in the EU by using prescriptions of general 
application to govern interstate relations – e.g. the regulations of EU law – rather than 
contracts and commands targeted at particular states, and by the principle of unanimity in 
                                                          
13
 Tuori and Tuori, n 5 above, 97. 
14
 As regards legality, the Attorney General of the CJEU has stated his opinion (14
th
 January 2015) that the OMT 
policy was not illegal (http://www.altalex.eu/content/advocate-general-cjeu-purchase-government-bonds-omts-
ecb-line-eu-law).  On the normative point, Majone has had to revise his assessment of the EU such that he now 
speaks of a ‘democratic default’: G. Majone, ‘From Regulatory State to a Democratic Default’ (2014) 52(6) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 1216–1223. 
15
 Cf. J. White, ‘Politicising Europe: The Challenge of Executive Discretion’, in S. Hobolt and O. Cramme (eds), 
Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
16
 See Article 3(1) TSCG: states are required to limit their structural budget deficit to 0.5% of GDP, with 
deviations allowed only in ‘exceptional circumstances’.  While the provision has precedents (in the Stability and 
Growth Pact, and another emergency measure - EU Reg. 1467/97) the requirement that it be embedded in 
domestic law (Article 3(2)) goes significantly further than hitherto.  Cf. F. Scharpf, ‘Political Legitimacy in a 
Non-optimal Currency Area’, in S. Hobolt and O. Cramme (eds), Democratic Politics in a European Union 
under Stress (Oxford: OUP, 2014). 
 8 
treaty-making and amendment.
17
  Again, in the period in question this arrangement has been 
challenged: in addition to the conditionality mechanisms noted, which target individual states 
and embed sharp asymmetries between EU members, one may observe how, to accelerate its 
introduction, the Fiscal Compact was designed to come into effect before all EU members had 
ratified it.
18
  While this may be consistent with international law, it breaks with how treaty-
making has been traditionally conducted amongst EU states,
19
 and suggests the consent of 
some EU members was of diminished importance relative to others.  In such ways the norm of 
equality and its associated procedures have been transgressed in the name of decisive action 
to reassure the markets. 
State sovereignty, democratic control, political contestation and the equality of states: 
these, and just as importantly the institutional procedures that concretise them, are just some 
of the norms of the EU breached by executive decision-making in this period.  As these 
observations suggest, norms are to be understood as widely accepted standards of appropriate 
conduct.
20
  They involve ideas of right action, coupled with scripts of routinized behaviour 
that are held to express these ideas.  While some undoubtedly have a textual basis (norms thus 
codified typically being referred to as rules or laws), others are expressed principally in 
intersubjective agreement and tacit knowledge.  These standards, we may stipulate, are the 
subject of broad consensus, even if constantly evolving and if, in a pluralist setting, 
persistently subject in some degree to second-order disagreements of interpretation.  
As a category of both evaluation and action, norms pose a challenge of identification.
21
  
Settled practice may be an indicator, but an imperfect one given norms can persist for some 
                                                          
17
 Cf. D. Chalmers and M. Chaves, ‘Union Democratic Overload and the Unloading of European Democracy’, in 
S. Hobolt and O. Cramme (eds), Democratic Politics in a European Union under Stress (Oxford: OUP, 2014).  
A statement concerning the equality of states can be found in Article 4(2) TEU. 
18
 See Article 14 (2) TSCG. 
19
 See Article 48(4) and Article 48(6) TEU; cf. I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer and O. Parker, Politics in the 
European Union (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 227. 
20
 Cf. G. Brennan, L. Eriksson, R. Goodin and N. Southwood, Explaining Norms (Oxford: OUP, 2013), esp. 
chaps. 1-2; S. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 2011), 41. 
21
 Cf. I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’ (1999) 53(2) International Organization, 
379–408. 
 9 
time in the breach, and given not all behavioural regularities are norm-guided.
22
  Legal texts 
may provide a useful starting-point, though may be limited in what they say on how norms 
find institutional expression.  The pronouncements of a judiciary may offer some clues, but 
only for norms of a legal type.  Perhaps the most promising
23
 indicator of the existence of 
norms is what happens when actors depart from them.  Departures tend to be widely 
condemned as such, or advocated despite being such, by competent political observers, be 
these political figures, commentators, or ordinary citizens.  The norm-breaches in the Euro 
crisis described have been the subject of considerable controversy, with MPs and MEPs, 
observers in the media and scholars all voicing unease at their transgression.
24
  The capacity 
of these actions to provoke a measure of outrage reminds that, however imperfectly such 
norms were instantiated in the pre-crisis EU order – and there can be no suggestion they were 
universally well served – what happened in the Euro crisis marked a significant escalation in 
their evasion.  
In order for political authority to be legitimate, a polity’s most basic norms must 
plausibly command the view that they are generally binding and consistently adhered to by all 
relevant parties.  Rule that does not express the bindingness of core political norms ultimately 
becomes indistinguishable from arbitrary rule – rule that, while it may sometimes deliver 
acceptable results, does not do so on any predictable and responsive basis.
25
  Moreover, the 
felt obligation to comply with a norm, though it may have a range of moral sources, is 
typically nurtured by this belief in its capacity to constrain.
26
  This is why a significant breach 
                                                          
22
 Cf. Brennan et al, n 20 above, chaps. 1-2; Hurd, n 21 above.   
23
 It remains imperfect – political observers do not speak with one voice, and are sometimes acquiescent in 
executive discretion, while executives themselves, as noted below, may have independent reason to proclaim 
their actions as exceptional.   
24
 See e.g. the critical response of the German Bundestag in Nov. 2012 to the aid package for Greece agreed by 
Eurozone finance ministers and the IMF and to the limited opportunities for its parliamentary contestation. 
25
 These broad observations are inspired by the account of republican freedom provided in Q. Skinner, Liberty 
before Liberalism (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).  I do not discuss consequentialist forms of legitimacy in detail here, 
but assume they too require norm-based legitimacy if they are to be consistent with democratic standards of non-
arbitrary rule. 
26
 Principles of generality and bindingness are generally considered core elements of the rule of law – cf. B. 
Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). 
 10 
of norms potentially poses a challenge to a polity’s legitimate authority.27  As the latter part of 
this paper explores, there are two relevant points of contrast: when a political order’s norms 
lack demonstrable bindingness yet its decisions still widely command the view they should be 
followed (i.e. forms of descriptive authority, rooted e.g. in the perception that norms are more 
stably and generally binding than they really are), and when a political order lacks authority 
of any kind (and when, to the extent that its demands are complied with at all, it is due mainly 
to the wish to avoid sanction).  
In contexts where the application of extraordinary methods can be concealed, the wider 
legacy of emergency rule may be limited.  Where breaches of norms can be done covertly, 
and innovations presented as upholding the commitments of the existing order, larger 
questions of authority may be avoided.
28
  But exceptionalism cannot always be hidden – in 
particular where its effectiveness is thought to depend on its visibility.  Sometimes true in 
conventional security-driven states of emergency, this has certainly been the case with the 
politics of the Euro crisis.  Executives have tended to be explicit about the degree to which 
they are exceeding existing norms: there has been little pretence to ‘business as usual’.29  The 
Commission President has spoken openly about ‘exceptional measures for exceptional 
times’,30 the ECB chief has likewise spoken of ‘exceptional measures’31 and has asserted the 
‘full discretion’ of the Bank’s governing council to embark on a new monetary policy,32 while 
                                                          
27
 In the EU context, questions of norm-adherence are typically approached in terms of the compliance of 
individual member-states rather than the EU institutions as a whole.  Touching on the question of ‘systemic’ 
departures, see A. von Bogdandy and M. Ioannidis, ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law: what it is, what 
has been done, what can be done’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review, 59–96. 
28
 On undeclared states of emergency: Gross and Ní Aoláin, n 6 above, 305, 318-319. 
29
 This instance of emergency rule resembles the so-called ‘accommodation’ model – i.e. selective suspensions, 
violations and improvisations around the margins of an ostensibly stable legal framework – rather than either 
‘business-as-usual’ legality or the wholesale interruption of legality (cf. Gross and Ní Aoláin, n 6 above, chaps 
1-3). 
30
 Barroso, statement to the press following the meeting of eurozone Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 27 
October 2011, speech/11/713. 
31
 Draghi, Die Zeit, 29th August 2012: ‘We have to […] ensure a single monetary policy and therefore price 
stability for all euro area citizens. This may at times require exceptional measures.’ 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120829.en.html. 
32
 Draghi, press conference, 6
th
 September 2012: ‘Governing Council will decide on the start, continuation and 
suspension of Outright Monetary Transactions in full discretion ...’ (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-
06/draghi-s-statement-on-ecb-outright-monetary-transactions-text.html). 
 11 
heads of government have used high-profile summits to launch a succession of new initiatives 
(EFSF, ESM, the Fiscal Compact, etc.) with little suggestion that these are just the extension 
of existing treaty obligations.
33
  
If the extent of executive discretion has been scarcely concealed, even openly 
proclaimed and celebrated, this is presumably the function of a belief that actions need to be 
advertised to be effective.  The logic of reassuring the markets, so fundamental to the crisis 
response, seems to require not only that extraordinary measures be taken but that they be 
demonstrably taken.
34
  Arguably this forms one of the distinctive features of the economic 
state of emergency:
35
 were the measures adopted less visible, they would apparently lose 
some of their effectiveness in assuaging the concerns of market actors.  This point is 
important, because the visibility of departures from norms is arguably more significant for 
their subsequent credibility than the fact of departure as such.
36
  Generally speaking, a 
normative order can withstand plenty of evasion, but will do so more easily where these 
challenges are not widely recognised.  Where exceptionalism has been open for all to see, it 
becomes harder later on for executive powers simply to deny its occurrence.
37
  Rather, the 
bindingness of norms must be re-established.   
 
 
Authority restored?  
 
                                                          
33
 To be sure, these actors have not proclaimed their exceptional measures to be illegal: efforts have been made, 
retrospectively and creatively, to show these measures were not expressly ruled out by the established regimes of 
EU and national law.  What has been emphasised is rather discretion in the shape of departures from hitherto-
accepted standards of conduct on which the law is silent or inconclusive.   
34
 Cf. White, n 3 above.   
35
 A useful overview of this underexplored type is: W. Scheuerman, ‘The Economic State of Emergency’ (2000) 
21(5-6) Cardozo Law Review, 1869-1894. 
36
 On the loose relationship between practices and norms, especially where practices are inconspicuous, see 
Brennan et al., n 20 above, 20ff. 
37
 Though some may try: on efforts by the Commission and ECB to claim their actions of crisis management 
were consistent with democratic accountability, see B. Rittberger, ‘Integration without Representation? The 
European Parliament and the Reform of Economic Governance in the EU’ (2014) 52(6) Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 1174–1183.   
 12 
The idea of a state of emergency implies the possibility of isolating a passage of time for a 
distinctive form of governing.  In addition to the discourse of exception itself (i.e. the 
grounding of decision-making in appeals to emergency), the peculiarity of that period is 
marked by irregular institutional measures, coupled to a greater or lesser extent with a 
departure from political ethics.
38
  The contention is that the usual modes of government – the 
procedures that compose them, the norms they instantiate – are inadequate for dealing with an 
extreme set of circumstances.
39
  In all cases the logic of the claim is that there is a beginning 
and an end: normality is merely interrupted.
40
  While the intervening period clearly must have 
some consequences for the period of normality expected to follow – commonly it is said to 
make the latter possible – it is not expected to merge with it or set precedents for it.  As with 
Las Vegas, what happens in the exception stays in the exception. 
If the political order is to carry legitimate authority – if, that is, people are to have good 
reason to see its norms as generally binding – then clearly much hinges on the possibility of 
delimiting the period of emergency rule in this way such that the irregularities it entails do not 
call into question the long-term status of those norms.  An act of separation is needed such 
that it can be plausibly inferred that emergency rule has been concluded and its return is not 
imminent.  In a well-developed constitutional order, it may be this act of separation can be 
performed by institutional means, i.e. by having two identifiably distinct governing regimes, 
                                                          
38
 For an overview of the institutional forms, see Gross and Ní Aoláin, n 6 above, Part I; Klieman, n 6 above; K. 
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 See e.g. S. Sheeran, ‘Reconceptualizing States of Emergency Under International Human Rights Law: Theory, 
Legal Doctrine, and Politics’ (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law, 491-557 (esp. 500).   
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one associated with emergency rule and one with normality.
41
  In the context of the EU, 
emergency rule does not have its own defined set of practices.
42
  This stems from how the 
competences of its principal institutions are weakly codified, and more generally from the 
traditionally dispersed nature of sovereign power within it.  As a consequence, the act of 
separation between exception and norm must take the form of a claim.  Decision-makers must 
be in a position to advance some type of account of how emergency rule has been superseded.     
Certainly many of those wielding executive discretion in the latter period of the Euro 
crisis have invoked the goal of exiting an extraordinary period and returning to one more 
ordered.  Discretion is generally said to be necessary only so as to establish a better rule-
bound order,
43
 and some of the extraordinary measures adopted can be seen as efforts to 
regularise previous acts of exceptionalism.  There are furthermore good reasons why decision-
makers might wish to argue there comes a moment when emergency politics ends and a new 
period of normality begins.  The legitimacy of emergency rule is always questionable, not 
least because the exercise of power is more visible under such conditions.  Government by 
emergency is a gamble, and whatever the short-term advantages it brings, at some point it 
becomes desirable for executives to say words to the effect that from now on, norms are 
sovereign.
44
  
The question is whether executives are in a position to do this, i.e. plausibly to claim the 
resolution of emergency politics and the advent of a new period of normality in which norms 
are binding.  What might be done such that those faced with the choice whether to comply 
                                                          
41
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with them, as well as those who might urge such compliance of others, have good reason to 
regard them as worthwhile commitments and to be confident they will not be suspended or 
rendered irrelevant due to subsequent events?    
I suggest there are three main ways in which a claim to this effect might be made, and 
that in the contemporary EU the conditions for each are unavailable.
45
  We shall consider 
them in turn.  The analysis highlights some of the limitations of the EU as presently 
configured, as well as some broader features of the structure of emergency rule, particularly 
as it pertains to the transnational sphere. 
 
1. First it may be claimed that the conditions of crisis that made emergency rule necessary 
have passed and are unlikely to return for the foreseeable future.  The threats have 
simply been overcome.
46
  There will hence be no renewed need for suspensions and 
improvisations under the sign of emergency.  Such a claim might rest on the idea that 
circumstances have changed, or that today’s policy-making is qualitatively better than 
yesterday’s at solving problems as they arise.  A superior order has been instituted, 
better attuned to the challenges faced.  The political order’s norms should be regarded 
as credible because there will be no need to interfere with them in future. 
          While executive actors in contemporary Europe have indeed made claims to this 
effect, centred on remedying the design flaws of the Eurozone,
47
 there are reasons for 
cautious appraisal. This line of argument overstates the capacity of executives to allay 
fears of a return of crisis conditions.  Even policy-making that is in some sense 
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‘optimal’ is such only for a given set of circumstances and relative to certain values.  To 
the extent that these background conditions inevitably change in unforeseeable ways, 
one can expect situations of maladjustment and extreme stress to recur.  This holds 
particularly true if efforts to deal with previous crises sow the seeds of the next one.  It 
is not unusual for crisis response to draw on the same ideas that the crisis itself put in 
question.  In the EU context, prominent economists tell us that the austerity policies 
adopted as emergency measures in recent years will themselves increase the likelihood 
of future crises in the Eurozone and beyond.
48
  The remedy contributes to the disease.  
Assertions that crisis has been left behind must ring hollow therefore.   
Such a claim furthermore ignores the ambiguity of what constitutes a crisis.  
Executive discretion in the name of urgent threat is never born solely of necessity: it 
depends on actors’ willingness to identify certain conditions as those of a crisis, and the 
willingness of others to accept this diagnosis.
49
  Given those who have engaged in 
emergency politics may have derived advantage from doing so, there will be a persistent 
temptation to repeat it, irrespective of objective circumstances and notwithstanding the 
interim benefits of government by norms.  A claim based on system capacity and a 
change in environmental conditions misses this important point.  Moreover, in the 
economic domain, definitions of crisis are also heavily shaped by powerful private 
actors (investors and ratings agencies, for instance).
50
  Given their role in co-producing 
and announcing the crisis, one may be sceptical of the capacity of executives to forecast 
the retreat of crisis conditions. 
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2. A second type of claim would hold that, although the prospect of crisis persists, when it 
comes it will not be handled with resort to executive discretion because a new 
framework has been instituted that will constrain the actions of executives.  The post-
crisis norms, it may be said, are better insulated from executive interference.  On the 
grounds that there can be no unconventional manoeuvres next time, the norms of the 
day are pronounced as binding. 
          The credibility of such a claim hangs first on whether serious efforts are made to 
replace the emergency regime with a standardised decision-making structure. The 
accumulation of emergency measures tends to leave a fragmented institutional terrain.  
Either because they have been designed to allow decision-makers flexibility of action in 
dealing with crisis conditions, or because, introduced hastily, they clash with and 
duplicate one another, the provisions of emergency rule are unlikely themselves to be a 
reliable constraint on the future exercise of discretion.  Any notion of legal hierarchy, as 
expressed in the primacy-of-EU-law doctrine, will be left disrupted by the resulting 
pluralisation of legal forms, and the level of opacity these arrangements produce allows 
further freedom from scrutiny.
51
  A convincing claim to have moved beyond executive 
discretion thus depends on moves to repeal emergency provisions or integrate them into 
a new, more regularised structure.  One need only look at the governing arrangements 
emerging from the Euro crisis to see that such a process is highly incomplete.  On the 
contrary, some of the regulations passed seem actually to embed opportunities for the 
future exercise of executive discretion.  Ostensibly firm rules are defined – cf. Reg. 
1174/2011 – but with provisions for the Commission and Council to overlook them 
should ‘exceptional economic circumstances’ warrant it.52  What constitutes exceptional 
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circumstances is itself dependent on their own empirical readings.  Rather than the 
repeal or regularisation of emergency rule, this looks like its indefinite extension.
53
   
           More generally, a convincing claim to have limited the capacity for executive 
discretion is likely to depend on the visible empowerment of other institutions.  It might 
hinge on legislative actors being given greater powers of decision-making, or judicial 
actors enjoying greater powers for holding executives to account.  Insofar as new 
restraints on executive power have been conceived in the post-crisis EU setting 
however, these have tended to involve a diversity of executive actors constraining each 
other.  The terms of the European Semester entail oversight by the Commission and 
Council, influenced in turn by other executive agencies such as the ECB and IMF.
54
  
The role of the CJEU remains uncertain, especially given the latitude for interpretation 
accorded to the Commission, and the Court’s traditional weakness in the 
macroeconomic domain.
55
  While the discretion of specific governments may be 
constrained, executive discretion in general remains the system’s defining feature.56 
Furthermore, even were there clear EU constitutional restraints, recent years have 
shown that executives retain the option of going outside the EU framework to make 
arrangements based on international law.
57
  This is one of the distinctive challenges of 
decision-making in a transnational setting.  Faced with the protracted processes of EU 
law-making, Europe's executive powers have tended to prefer ad hoc arrangements – 
                                                          
53
 That political will can also obstruct the unmaking of emergency measures is evident from the experiences of 
constitutional states: on ‘permanent, complex and institutionalised’ emergency regimes in such countries as 
Israel, the US and UK, see Gross and Ní Aoláin, n 6 above, 175ff. 
54
 M. Dawson and F. de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-crisis’ (2013) 76(5) Modern Law 
Review, 817-844; Scharpf, n 16 above; Joerges, ‘Brother, …’, n 8 above. 
55
 Cf. Tuori and Tuori, n 5 above, 39. 
56
 There is some evidence of the strengthening of national parliaments in the Euro crisis, particularly – though 
not only – the Bundestag (cf. Curtin, n 3 above, 25ff.), but the process is an uneven one, and the capacity of 
parliamentarians to exercise their new powers is questionable (cf. Fossum and Menéndez, n 3 above, 16). 
57
 Cf. the Fiscal Compact and European Stability Mechanism in particular.  For discussion: E. Chiti and P. G. 
Teixeira, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis’ 
(2013) 50 Common Market Law Review, 683–708.  NB the Pringle judgment affirms the right of member-states 
to do this, provided they do not thereby change the essential character of the EU institutions. 
 18 
legal in form, yet in no sense part of a comprehensive legal framework.
58
  This 
abundance of options for rule-making has the effect of reinforcing executive discretion, 
allowing frameworks to be sidestepped when they become inconvenient.  As long as 
national governments retain the capacity to make foreign policy, when thwarted by the 
EU’s institutions they are likely to seek ‘coalitions of the willing’ outside its structures. 
The price of keeping them inside may be agreements whose provisions are deliberately 
vague: hence the difficulty of enforcing executive compliance with norms.  The 
implication is that the polity’s norms following emergency rule will be as susceptible to 
suspension or marginalisation as those before.  The possibility of credibly drawing a 
firm line under the emergency regime is difficult to accept. 
 
3. A third type of claim would be that the identity of the decision-makers has changed: that 
those who engaged in emergency politics no longer hold office.  Such a claim might 
take as its starting-point the idea that it will never be feasible to design institutions such 
that exceptionalism is impossible: rather, everything depends on the inclinations of the 
individuals in charge.  Some will seek to maximise their discretion; others will seek to 
handle a crisis relying on established norms, and where revisions are necessary will 
submit these to a public process of deliberation rather than force them through as an 
urgent necessity.   Following this line of argument, the reason why Europe’s citizens 
should approach the EU’s norms with renewed confidence in their authority is that those 
who (ab)used discretion in the past will not be in a position to do so again.   
          This type of claim may have some plausibility in the context of a democratic 
state.  The difficulty in alternative settings is the lack of institutional mechanisms by 
which a change of personnel can be heralded.  Elections are typically the means by 
which the ritual of catharsis is performed in political life.  Yet there is no opportunity to 
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expel in one go the principal executive actors of the EU.  The offices of the ECB are 
appointed on a long-term basis (eight-year terms for the presidency), and without an 
electoral component.  The Commission’s connection to electoral politics is notoriously 
weak, and the presentation of alternative would-be presidents (Spitzenkandidaten) in 
2014 offered little additional capacity to a deliver a verdict on its actions in the 
preceding years.
59
  Nor is the Council directly elected: its composition changes on what 
is – from a European perspective – an arbitrary basis, since it follows the varied rhythms 
and concerns of national politics.
60
  The Parliament does have a basis in European 
elections, and on some readings has become a more powerful and assertive actor during 
the crisis period.  Though little able to shape measures taken outside the EU framework, 
it has had some influence over the legal provisions known as the ‘six-pack’ and ‘two-
pack’, consolidating its modest empowerment in the Treaty of Lisbon. 61   Still, it 
remains on balance one of the weaker EU institutions,
62
 and can scarcely be treated as a 
major source of political discretion in recent years, certainly relative to the Council.  To 
vote out its incumbents is hardly to vote out those responsible for the exercise of 
emergency rule.  Again, it is not possible then to draw a clear line separating the 
emergency regime from something that might succeed it: at least for a significant period 
of time, the same people are responsible for both. 
          Even when that ceases to be true, clearly it remains the case that even an entirely 
different set of executive actors might still be inclined to behave the same way.  If there 
are strong pressures emerging from the economic sphere (amongst others) that impel 
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executives towards discretionary action,
63
 and little opportunity for them to be held 
electorally accountable for their decisions, then there is little reason to attach great 
significance to a change in their individual composition.  
 
In sum, given broadly the existing configuration of the EU, it is difficult to imagine how a line 
might credibly be drawn under the recent period of extraordinary measures, even should those 
involved in them wish to.   The join between the emergency regime and its putative successor 
is seamless.  A considerable portion of the former outlives the crisis, yet with little to suggest 
it will not itself be subject to discretionary intervention in future. 
It is worth underlining that, under changed institutional conditions, stronger claims 
about the conclusion of emergency rule might be possible.  An EU displaying stronger 
parliamentary powers would permit more convincing assertions concerning the restraint of 
executive discretion and the changeover of governing personnel.  An EU that abandoned its 
commitment to austerity policies would permit more credible claims concerning the future 
avoidance of crisis conditions.  Efforts to reorder the EU in such ways would invite a revised 
assessment.  Admittedly, in the last instance executive discretion is not something that can be 
eradicated, and to this extent all claims to have moved beyond emergency rule must be met 
with caution.  Norms are always to some degree susceptible to exceptionalism, as Schmitt and 
others have convincingly insisted.
64
  But their pliability is a matter of degree, and in the 
circumstances analysed they must be considered persistently fragile.  
 
 
Legitimate authority lacking 
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Given the noted difficulty politicians face in convincingly consigning the emergency regime 
to the past, it seems clear the norms of the political order must remain in question.  If 
legitimate authority depends on people having good reason to see them as generally binding, 
the open-endedness of emergency rule poses a fundamental challenge, as it makes hard to 
dismiss the prospect of these norms being manipulated once more.  Hard to reasonably sustain 
is the belief that they are stable and general commitments reliably adhered to.  Such an 
appraisal invites itself particularly for those interested parties who might be called upon to 
respect those norms, including political actors such as governments (who, taken individually, 
are objects as much as authors of these frameworks), and commercial actors such as banks 
and corporations.  Ordinary citizens too have little reason in these circumstances to approach 
the norms of their political order with confidence.  Let us examine the difficulties for 
legitimate authority more closely. 
Most obviously in question are the specific norms breached or suspended during the 
period of emergency politics.  The suspicion must be that if this fate can befall them once it 
can do so again.  Norms of the kind identified above – to do with state sovereignty, 
democratic control, political contestation and the equality of states, and the wealth of 
institutional procedures and routines that may be said to serve them – look persistently 
vulnerable in this regard.  If a repeat of their violation can hardly be excluded, the credibility 
of such norms remains tarnished.  There can be little reasonable basis for a belief in their 
capacity to constrain.   
If such a fate befell only those norms suspended or transgressed, the significance would 
be local overall.  An experimentalist rationale for the polity would still be possible: it could be 
defended as a form of spontaneous order, evolving by trial and error as much as conscious 
 22 
direction.
65
  But it is not just the norms directly challenged that are affected.  The binding 
character of ostensibly unrelated norms – i.e. those neither breached nor evaded – is also at 
stake.  The larger constellation of norms is put in question, and thus the political order as a 
whole.
66
  This follows partly from the way political improvisation leads, as noted, to the 
accumulation of ad hoc measures which stand in a coherent relation neither to each other nor 
to the institutional structures that preceded them.  Adopted swiftly for short-term goals and 
often with little deliberation, these measures may duplicate existing provisions, challenging 
the integrity of the wider framework.
67
   
It follows also from the simple observation that if executives are willing to intervene 
with discretion in one area they may be willing to do so in another.  The limits to political 
discretion become difficult to establish with confidence.  The point is not, of course, that the 
majority of institutional norms will necessarily become subject to emergency-led suspensions, 
amendments and so on.  Bureaucracies depend on a measure of continuity, in the EU no less 
than elsewhere.  Without such continuity, the very idea of norms would be in doubt.  But 
though the exercise of discretion may be limited in scale, the difficulty faced is how to know 
which norms are ‘real’ and which merely apparent.  Clearly not all are equally likely to be 
transgressed: it is not a random matter, and an analysis of political and socio-economic power 
structures may provide some clues.  But the course of emergency rule is sufficiently 
unpredictable, particularly if the underlying conditions of crisis are real, that few elements of 
a polity’s legal and political architecture can be regarded as wholly secure.  Not knowing 
which norms can be relied upon and which can safely be discounted, the observer must direct 
a measure of doubt towards all.  They are interdependent as concerns their credibility.
68
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Note also that even where extraordinary measures do not explicitly contravene existing 
EU norms – e.g. because they are produced in heads-of-state meetings outside the EU 
framework – they may nonetheless put these latter in doubt, since they suggest their limited 
capacity to offer guidance in critical situations.
69
  When push comes to shove, the rule of 
persons is seen to displace the rule of norms.  Perhaps one should not be too surprised – it is 
arguably one of the tendencies latent in any political order
70
 – but it is especially problematic 
for one that has relied heavily on ideas of integration-through-law to legitimise itself.  
One might suppose the aspects of the political order spared this subversion are those 
that emerge for the first time in the context of emergency rule.  These, after all, are yet to 
develop a record of suspension.  Yet they too must have question-marks against them due to 
the conditions of their emergence.  Measures taken under the auspices of emergency are 
inevitably associated with necessity rather than desirability, haste rather than reflection.  They 
are likely to be tied closely to the details of a particular crisis, in a way that reduces their 
generalizability and long-term validity.
71
  Often they are intended to solve immediate 
problems rather than to stake out context-independent principles: for this reason they may 
become quickly obsolete, generating the need for further extraordinary measures, which in 
turn require replacing too.
72
  This piling up of problem-solving measures also introduces the 
likelihood of duplication, something which makes the status of each uncertain, as well as 
compromising the wider intelligibility of the order as a whole.   
It seems clear then that, given the difficulty of separating the emergency regime from 
something one might call normality, the constraining character of norms in general is in 
question following a period of emergency rule.  Good reasons to regard them as generally and 
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stably binding are lacking.  Given the prospect that the polity’s norms will continue to be 
applied selectively, a significant component of arbitrariness lingers, and its legitimate 
authority is compromised.   
It would be mistaken to see the experiences of the Euro crisis as wholly singular in this 
regard.  A polity may experience dramatic episodes of emergency politics more than once, 
with the result that the erosion of its legitimate authority is cumulative.  The concerns raised 
above to do with the difficulty of containing the exercise of emergency rule are borne out by 
the larger trajectory of European integration.  There are several precedents in EU history for 
the emergency politics witnessed since 2010.  The handling of the referenda rejections of the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2005 fit a pattern in some ways similar.  The holding of referenda 
was consistent with norms of political contestation and democratic control, and brought into 
play norms specific to referenda as a mode of consultation, notably the expectation that a 
popular rejection should act as a veto of the initiative proposed.  When, following the 
referenda outcomes, heads of government repackaged largely the same text in the form of a 
second treaty and proceeded with ratification, it can fairly be said these norms were evaded.
73
  
The rejection of this second (Lisbon) treaty by referendum in Ireland again resulted not in its 
redrafting but in the repetition of the referendum.  These moves were widely defended as an 
existential necessity for the EU, the urgent threat posed by economic and institutional 
sclerosis.  The effect of these manoeuvres was surely to undermine the norms surrounding EU 
referenda.  Though in some ways rather different from the case under discussion – the appeal 
to emergency was largely the construct of political elites alone, without the direct 
involvement of economic actors, and the degree of political transformation it heralded was 
considerably lesser
74
 – these actions nonetheless bear a structural similarity with emergency 
rule as described. 
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If we extend our historical perspective to encompass the post-War period as a whole, we 
will note that executive discretion grounded in appeals to emergency has long been a feature 
of European transnationalism.  The first steps of the post-War integration process were highly 
discretionary, taking the form of interstate diplomacy and cooperation amongst administrative 
elites, and promoted publicly often with reference to the geopolitical demands of the Cold 
War.
75
  Given the norms of transnational European politics were barely formed at this stage, 
and the implications for national norms still uncertain, the challenge to authority remained 
limited.  As the integration process continued, so distinctive norms and attendant institutional 
procedures developed, reflecting and consolidating the increasing regularisation of 
transnational politics.
76
  Insofar as these emerging norms evolved to fit the requirements of 
executive power at the time, practices of evasion or violation were rare.  Yet these emerging 
norms held the latent capacity to manifest themselves as constraints on executive power 
should conditions change and new problems arise.   
The dialectic of rules and discretion referred to by legal theorists in the American 
pragmatist tradition is illuminating here: as policy-making becomes increasingly regularised, 
so the pressure for occasional discretionary intervention increases, which in turn creates new 
pressure for regularisation.
77
  As societies evolve, in their socio-economic practices and 
political ideals, a mismatch is likely to emerge between the context in which norms 
crystallised and the context in which they are encountered, with pressure for their 
circumvention as the result.  Combined with the intrinsic appeal of exceptionalism as a 
governing resource, and weak constitutional restraints on its exercise, its recurrence is to be 
expected.  The subsequent trajectory of the European political order has displayed, in this 
fashion, frequent outbreaks of intense executive discretion, typically defended in the idiom of 
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emergency, followed by the – ultimately impermanent – entrenchment of the governing 
arrangements thereby instituted.
78
  
The precariousness of legitimate authority may thus be seen as a deep-seated feature of 
EU history, bound up in its longer-term status as an arena of executive discretion par 
excellence.  The events of the Euro crisis have made this visible to a distinctive degree, but 
they are the continuation of a broader pattern.  The pattern would seem to extend to a number 
of other transnational institutions where far-reaching executive discretion in the name of 
emergency has been recurrent.  Observers of the UN Security Council note that it has come to 
act, in recent years especially, in ways that apparently compromise some of the constitutive 
norms of international politics – one thinks of UNSC’s increasing, unconventional reliance on 
the emergency powers associated with Chapter VII of the UN Charter to intervene widely in 
the domestic affairs of sovereign states (Res. 1373, passed to facilitate the post-9/11 ‘war on 
terrorism’, being the outstanding example).79  Such actions likewise put the UN’s legitimate 
authority in question, in a way that is not easily repaired. 
Although in the EU this pattern of wayward executive discretion shows every chance of 
persisting, certain developments could interrupt it.  One would be the emergence of genuine 
constitutional restraints on executive power, of the kind previously discussed.  Another would 
be the political rejection of executive-led emergency politics.  A critical question here is 
whether the spectre of emergency is likely to be an enduringly effective galvanising force or 
whether its repeated summoning depletes its power, making increasingly difficult the resort to 
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extraordinary measures.  This is a question of descriptive authority, examined in the final 
section.  
 
 
Compliance without legitimate authority? 
 
If emergency politics challenges norms in the way described, a natural inference is that the 
political order will widely come to be viewed with suspicion.  Lacking good reasons to see its 
norms as generally binding, and lacking criteria by which to decide which ones are ‘for real’ 
and which are contingent, citizens and organised actors may be expected to lose faith in the 
polity, either by showing themselves unmoved by its demands or by losing their expectation 
that others will adhere to them.  Having witnessed the willingness and enduring capacity of 
those ‘at the top’ to exercise discretion, they will withdraw their political consent.  
Compliance will be selective, in some areas non-existent, and a self-reinforcing process of 
decay will set in.  A weakness of legitimate authority will, in other words, manifest itself also 
in a weakness of descriptive authority, which in turn will entail a highly unpredictable 
political realm.   
This is certainly one feasible tendency shaping the legacy of emergency rule.  The 
public visibility of executive discretion in the present instance cannot fail to convince some 
that the status of norms is highly uncertain.  Sensing their recurrent circumvention under the 
sign of emergency can hardly be excluded, individuals and organisations may become 
sceptical.  A degree of volatility may ensue, as demands are selectively disregarded or as the 
political regime itself is challenged.  Such an outcome would be broadly in line with the 
‘politicisation’ hypothesis, that sees transnational institutions as destined to be increasingly 
contested due to a mismatch between the extent of the powers they exercise and the limited 
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legitimating resources they can draw on.
80
  In Europe, a repudiation of EU authority can be 
inferred in some measure from the dissent expressed towards EU decision-making by anti-
establishment parties and movements of Left and Right.  The sources of their opposition 
include not just hostility to the substance of policy-making but to the opportunistic use of 
crisis to rewrite the terms of the political order.
81
  The resistance of certain judiciaries, notably 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, to the emergency measures associated with the Euro-crisis can 
likewise be regarded as recognition of the affront they pose to the legitimate authority of the 
polity’s norms and a willingness to contest executive discretion.82 
Yet while increasing levels of contestation would be a plausible, even desirable 
outcome, there are reasons for circumspection: the wider legacy of emergency rule may be 
quite different.  There are two respects in which the capacity of the polity to command day-to-
day compliance may in fact be preserved, even boosted, by the experience of political 
exceptionalism.  First, there are ways in which descriptive authority may be augmented by 
emergency rule, even as legitimate authority is challenged.  Second, there are ways in which 
high levels of ordinary compliance may arise even as authority in general is compromised, 
due to considerations of power imbalance and political uncertainty.  It is important to consider 
both outcomes in some detail, as these are the currents against which agential efforts to 
contest authority must move. 
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That descriptive authority might increase at the height of emergency rule is not difficult 
to see.  If executives cannot plausibly disavow their exercise of discretion, the flipside is that 
they may claim credit for anything that passes for a positive development under their 
stewardship.  Emergency rule, precisely by suggesting the non-bindingness of norms and their 
associated institutional routines, puts executives, their decisions and their personas to the fore.  
If their leadership can somehow be said to be effective, then a form of authority may be 
achieved – buttressed perhaps by technocratic claims by the same political elites to be those 
best placed to judge whether it is effective.  This is one way to read the high levels of public 
satisfaction recorded for some executive powers at the height of the Euro crisis.
83
  To be sure, 
this authority may be descriptive rather than legitimate.  Being divorced from binding norms, 
it carries an unpredictable and arbitrary flavour.  It is also vulnerable to a downturn in the 
polity’s fortunes, and is thus a precarious basis for rule.  But for a period of time it may be a 
potent source of popular support, as the wider history of emergency politics bears out.
84
 
Less immediately apparent is that emergency rule may strengthen descriptive authority 
in the longer term.  The discourse of exceptionalism is two-sided: while on the one hand it 
seeks to justify departures from norms, at the same time it consolidates the notion there is 
such a thing as ‘normal times’ in which norms are generally binding.  Whenever the formula 
of ‘exceptional measures for exceptional times’ is announced, it evokes the accompanying 
idea of normality, arguably far more directly than most ‘normal’ forms of political discourse.  
In this way it cultivates receptivity to the idea that emergency rule can be superseded and an 
ordered setting restored.  Moreover, by accentuating the distinction between order and chaos, 
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the discourse of exceptionalism feeds the desire to exit a period of arbitrariness irrespective of 
the details of the order that follows.
85
 
The politics of emergency is conducive to descriptive authority also because the 
institutional structures that survive it, or the measures initiated under its auspices, may come 
to seem robust precisely because they have weathered a period of crisis.  They should be 
approached with extra confidence, runs the thought, since they have proven their durability in 
extreme circumstances (just as those that were sacrificed merely revealed their irrelevance).  
The descriptive authority of the post-emergency order may be especially high if its provisions 
are thought to have contributed to resolving the crisis, as this lends them an aura of potency.  
In the EU case under consideration, the ECB has been widely credited with restoring market 
confidence in the Eurozone (or simply ‘saving’ it), in particular with the bond-buying policy 
initiated in September 2012.
86
  Its activities achieve heightened descriptive authority 
accordingly, and what initially appeared instances of exceptionalism and improvisation – such 
as the OMT policy itself – can retrospectively come to seem norm-bound.  Their 
demonstrated utility, it may be said, guards them against future acts of executive discretion.  
Such confidence would most likely be misplaced, for reasons already examined.  It would be 
difficult to treat this descriptive authority as legitimate.  Often it is tied to the eulogising of 
individuals, and thus to the persistent possibility of discretion.
87
  Yet it clearly indicates how 
the legacy of emergency rule need not be disorder and non-compliance, indeed how 
successive periods of emergency politics may actually cultivate obedience.  
Let us move to the second point, which is that high levels of everyday compliance may 
arise even if the polity’s legitimate and descriptive authority is compromised by emergency 
rule.  Actors may have strong reasons to comply with the polity’s demands, even if they are 
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unmoved by norm-based considerations.  It is important to distinguish here between following 
norms and conforming to them.  The former involves non-instrumental action: norms are 
adhered to because their demands are accepted as valid.  Respecting them is the appropriate 
thing to do.  By contrast, conforming involves action principally motivated by instrumental 
concerns.  Norms are adhered to not because they are norms (their normative status may even 
be doubted), but because doing so brings some kind of advantage or avoidance of harm.
88
  
While the distinction is an analytical one, it usefully highlights the potential for compliance to 
prosper even where the authority of the political order is weak.   
Consider one set of provisions emerging from Europe’s emergency regime of recent 
years – the new budgetary rules of the European Semester.  Given their noted dissonance with 
the EU’s fundamental norms as earlier described, perhaps few relevant parties will feel it 
necessary to comply with these provisions because of some sense they are normatively valid.  
Yet actors have instrumental reasons to adhere to them, including the fines associated with 
breaking their terms or the desire to maintain goodwill, even where they are doubtful of the 
permanence and even-handedness of these arrangements.  That the sanctions associated with 
breaking these provisions are not always clear
89
 does not mean actors can discount them.  
Indeed, the opposite is true: where sanctions are unclear, there is no basis on which to 
anticipate the costs of non-compliance.  There can be no calculated decision to breach them 
based on a willingness to endure certain costs for the sake of a countervailing good.  Thus 
when national governments submit budgetary proposals under the terms of the European 
Semester, they have every reason to comply with the assessments of the Commission, even if 
the consequences of not doing so are unclear.  Clearly this holds particularly true to the extent 
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that sections of the wider public show little willingness to press for the contestation of such 
measures.
90
 
The larger point is that emergency rule increases political uncertainty.
91
  Uncertainty 
surrounds the mechanisms by which new measures are introduced, how far they are intended 
to be temporary or permanent, and to what extent and in what way they will be enforced.  
This compounds the uncertainty associated with the underlying socio-economic factors 
involved.  Discretionary politics also leads to the personalisation of political relations.
92
  
Where norms are upheld selectively by executives rather than quasi-automatically by 
anonymous administration, the goodwill of particular actors (including the German 
Chancellor and other prominent members of the Council) is a precious commodity, and the 
consequences of sacrificing it scarcely knowable.  The exigencies of ‘rule of persons’ are in 
this sense harder to ignore than those of the rule of law.  Under such conditions, compliance – 
however difficult to enact, given changing demands – will generally present itself as the 
prudent option.  Emergency rule may in this way foster conformity, even if norm-following is 
rendered more rare. 
Finally, the capacity to command compliance, even where the polity lacks authority, is 
facilitated by one of the well-known dynamics of authoritarian drift.  The effect of a period of 
pronounced discretionary decision-making is arguably to modify the expectations with which 
decision-making is met.  Actions which once seemed an affront to the polity’s norms become 
the new empirical standard against which conduct thereafter is assessed.  They recalibrate the 
scale – of what is thought realistic to expect, perhaps even of what is thought acceptable.93  
Though ever more drastic discretionary manoeuvres may be advanced, each may appear both 
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futile to resist (since they form a recurrent pattern) and merely an incremental advance on 
previous ones (since the wider shift they amount to is diffused over time).  Acts of 
exceptionalism are in this way received less as sources of provocation than as sources of 
information about ‘how things work’. 94   Public concern may therefore never reach the 
acuteness that invites outright repudiation, or may be diverted into a fatalist attitude.
95
  
Clearly, this should not be equated with the maintenance of authority: at any given moment 
these provisions are liable to appear as the expendable commitments executives treat them as.  
But this perpetual resetting of reference-points may make it easier for citizens to live with 
demands whose authority they weakly believe in.  Emergency politics subverts the standards 
by which it is assessed, thereby insulating decision-makers from the critique to which they 
might otherwise be subject.
96
  Here lies an explanation for why previous episodes of 
exceptionalism in the history of European integration – including the Lisbon Treaty’s 
implementation as previously noted – have been limited in the resistance they produce.  More 
powerfully than they provoke censure, they reduce expectations. 
Whether then in the form of the maintenance or increase of descriptive authority, or in 
the form of conformity without authority but for instrumental reasons, there are discernible 
mechanisms by which emergency rule may reduce volatility rather than fuel it.  It is as 
conducive to stability as to disarray.  Though well-organised political movements may 
counter such tendencies – and important signs of dissent are present in some countries – the 
practices of emergency rule are less vulnerable to contestation than they might initially seem.  
This matters because although descriptive authority or instrumental conformism may be 
functionally adequate, achieving the outward appearance of order, both outcomes are clearly 
unsatisfactory.  Where authority rests on misplaced faith in executive power or in the binding 
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character of the order’s norms, it expresses the autonomy of elites from their constituencies.  
Where norms are widely approached instrumentally, it expresses the view they are obstacles 
to be negotiated rather than expressions of collective self-rule, and reveals low confidence in 
the fairness and coherence of the system.
97
  A kind of ‘constitutional anomie’ develops, in 
which the political order offers weak normative guidance to its citizens.  Clearly in both cases 
the polity can still be held to a normative standard, but that standard will be of the observer’s 
conceiving rather than one that is immanent in the institutional order itself.  Prime amongst 
the legacies of emergency politics is a polity of weak ethical foundation.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Emergency rule presents itself as a self-contained episode, the interruption of something 
enduring.  The very idea of exceptional measures implies the awaited resumption of political 
normality, with the connotations of legitimacy this widely implies.  But it is less clear this 
resumption can happen.  Once executives have shown the extent of their willingness to use 
discretion, their challenge is to demonstrate they can now step back from it.  In the context of 
the contemporary EU, claims to this effect are difficult to make.  The emergency regime is 
hard to consign to the past.   
One must assume the stature of norms is consequently frail, and given the difficulty of 
individualising these, the stature of the political order more generally.  There is a want of 
legitimate authority after emergency rule, not least because that ‘after’ itself is elusive.  Day-
to-day compliance may persist however, motivated by misplaced confidence in the binding 
character of norms, or by strategic calculation rather than an acceptance of their intrinsic 
validity.  Indeed there is cause to suppose the politics of the extraordinary actually heightens 
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the willingness to comply.  This conformity is fragile admittedly, for it depends on a degree of 
obliviousness to the challenge emergency rule poses to legitimate authority.  But as time 
passes and as normative standards are reset or become blurred, acceptance can be expected to 
harden.  The resulting regime is weakly legitimate, yet risks being all the more functional for 
its brush with emergency rule. 
Recognising the challenge that exceptionalism poses, it is sometimes suggested that 
measures introduced under the sign of emergency should be submitted to post-hoc public 
approval, e.g. by referendum, as a way of restoring legitimate authority.  Emergency measures 
can then be submitted to the deliberative scrutiny absent at the point of their conception.  The 
argument has been advanced for the EU in the wake of the discretionary activities discussed.
98
  
If, however, emergency politics is double-edged in the way described, tending to consolidate 
descriptive authority even as it compromises legitimate authority, this approach is clearly 
problematic.  Public approval may be all too forthcoming, for it is consulted at a moment 
where opinion itself is likely to have been shaped by the experience of exceptionalism.  
Notwithstanding some honourable exceptions, even courts have a well-known tendency to 
adjust to the ‘reality on the ground’.99  Although the point cannot be developed here, this 
suggests they too may be a weak source of retrospective accountability, at least if we go by 
their existing record.
100
 
A reckoning with the decisions taken under emergency rule may have to wait for 
ideologically committed actors such as parties and movements, robust enough to resist 
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premature compromise with the emerging order, and sufficiently mindful of public opinion as 
to seek to influence it.  Beyond disrupting the accretion of descriptive authority, their task 
would be to expose the agendas that lie behind emergency rule and to highlight the paths not 
taken, before seeking popular support for an institutional reordering or constitutional 
refounding.  In the longer term there would seem to be no substitute for constraining 
executive discretion ex ante, both by strengthening the constitutional limits within which it 
must operate, and by the political means of reinforcing the institutions and actors that may 
contest its exercise in real time.  
